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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
the harshness of the statute in accordance with the legislative purpose, and is
consistent with the accepted method of treating out of state convictions for
purposes of the recidivist statutes in general.
EFFECT OF OUT OF STATE CONVICTION UPON RECIDMST STATUTES
Sections 1941 and 1942 of the New York Penal Law require a sentencing
judge, in applying the recidivist statutes, to consider defendant's out-of-state
convictions. When the crime is a felony where committed, but only a misde-
meanor if committed in New York, the statutes require that the foreign felony
conviction be treated as only a misdemeanor. 34
Since the foreign indictment usually alleges more than the bare statutory
crime, do the New York courts consider only the statute, the indictment, or
both, in determining whether the foreign felony conviction is to be treated as
a misdemeanor in New York?
The New York rule, set out in People v. Olah,35 is that if the crime as
defined by the foreign statute could under any set of facts be only a mis-
demeanor if committed in New York, the New York courts will treat the
crime as a misdemeanor, even though the indictment charges an act which
would be a felony if committed in New York. 6
In People v. Jackson3 7 defendant contended that since one of the two
acts defined by the foreign statute under which he was convicted was only a
misdemeanor under New York law, 8 the indictment should be disregarded, and
the foreign felony conviction must be treated as a misdemeanor in New York.
The Court of Appeals rejected this contention, holding that the indictment
must be considered when it plainly charges only that crime which would be a
felony under New York law.39
The Court noted, that the purpose of the Olak rule is to eliminate dis-
crimination in New York courts against defendants because they have been
convicted of foreign felonies which might not be felonies if committed in New
York. This decision limits the effect of the Olak rule, but preserves its intent,
for it denies discrimination in favor of such defendants.
DOUBLE JEOPADY-NEW YoRK "WAVR" DocTRnq SURvns IMPACT OF
GREEN CASE
Defendant's failure to except to an erroneous jury charge precludes his
raising that exception on appeal.40 In People v. Cipolla,41 the trial judge
erroneously charged that sodomy second degree is included in or is a lesser
34. N.Y. Pr. LAW §§ 1941-1942.
35. 300 N.Y. 96, 89 N.E.2d 329 (1949).
36. People v. Martin, 308 N.Y. 823, 125 N.E.2d 873 (1955); People v. Kronich,
308 N.Y. 866, 126 N.E.2d 307 (1955).
37. 5 N.Y.2d 243, 183 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1959).
38. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 405.
39. N.Y. Par. LAW § 404.
40. N.Y. COD Cxrm. PRoc. § 420-a; People v. Cohen, 5 N.Y.2d 282, 184 N.Y.S.2d
340 (1959).
41. 6 N.Y.2d 922, 190 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1959).
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degree of sodomy first degree,42 and the defendant failed to except this charge.
The jury convicted him of sodomy second degree, but made no finding as to
sodomy first degree.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Fourth Department's dismissal of the
sodomy second degree conviction, because the indictment failed to charge that
crime,43 but rejected defendant's contention that the jury had impliedly
acquitted him of sodomy first degree, and ordered a new trial as to that
crime.
The Appellate Division had allowed defendant to argue the error in the
trial court's charge on appeal, and had dismissed the sodomy first degree
conviction, holding that the jury's failure to find defendant guilty of that
crime effected an implied acquittal.44
In reversing the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
New York rule, expressed in People v. Palmer,45 that a defendant convicted
of a lesser included crime who obtains a reversal of his conviction on appeal,
is deemed to have "waived" his right not to be tried again as to the higher
crime charged in the indictment.46 This decision determines New York's posi-
tion in the controversy sparked by Green v. United States, 47 which eliminated
42. It was not until this decision that such a charge was held to be erroneous.
Defendant contended on appeal that the rape and sodomy statutes axe in pari tnateria,
and since rape second degree is not included in or is not a lesser degree of rape first degree,
the Court should accordingly hold that sodomy second degree is not included in or is not
a lesser degree of sodomy first degree. N.Y. Sss. LAws 1950, c. 525; Gov. Mem. on Ap-
proved Bills, N.Y. STArK LEois. ANNuAL (1950) 353; Spence, The Law of Crime Against
Nature, 32 N.C.L. Rav. 312, 319-320 (1954); People v. Burch, 281 App. Div. 348, 120
N.Y.S.2d 82 (4th Dep't 1953); People v. Andrewski, 282 App. Div. 827, 122 N.Y.S.2d
853 (4th Dep't 1953).
43. People v. Goyette, 282 App. Div. 980, 125 N.Y.S.2d 510 (3d Dep't 1953); People
v. Allen, 5 Denio (N.Y.) 76 (1847); Dedieu v. People, 22 N.Y. 178 (1860); People v.
Santoro, 229 N.Y. 277, 128 N.E. 234 (1920). Cf. dicta in People v. Miller, 143 App. Div.
251, 128 N.Y. Supp. 549 (1st Dep't 1911); People v. Colburn, 162 App. Div. 651, 147
N.Y. Supp. 689 (2d Dep't 1914); People v. Quinn, 8 Misc. 2d 546, 161 N.Y.S.2d 977,
aff'd 171 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1st Dep't 1957).
44. 7 A.D.2d 698, 179 N.Y.S.2d 459 (4th Dep't 1958). The constitutional right
involved is not federal, but state. N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 6. In preparation for appeal,
respondent considered but did not present the federal question argument that a retrial
as to sodomy first degree was a denial of due process. A retrial apparently does not
violate due process. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Brock v. North Carolina,
344 U.S. 424 (1953); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958); Ciuccl v. Illinois, 356
U.S. 571 (1958).
45. 109 N.Y. 413, 17 N.E. 213 (1888).
46. Where the graver crime does not include the lesser offense, the reversal of the
conviction and the new trial order as to the less serious crime does not disturb the disposi-
tion as to the graver crime. Guenther v. People, 24 N.Y. 100 (1861); People v. Dowllng,
84 N.Y. 478 (1881) ; People v. Cox, 67 App. Div. 344, 73 N.Y. Supp. 774 (3d Dep't 1901) ;
People v. Migliori, 271 App. Div. 798, 65 N.Y.S.2d 260 (2d Dep't 1946); Comment, 7
BuFALo L. Rav. 461, 472 (1958); Note, 24 BROOKLN L. Rav. 349, 351 (1958). Since
this case involved a non-included crime being treated as an included crime, a contrary
decision would not have overruled the Palmer case. This decision indicates the Court
of Appeals' willingness to adhere to the Palmer rule where in fact it need not be applied.
47. 355 U.S. 184 (1957). In the Green case defendant was convicted of murder
second degree under an indictment charging felony murder, which are non-included crimes.
The jury failed to return a verdict as to the graver crime. The Court reversed the con-
viction as to murder second degree and held, 5-4, that to retry defendant for the graver
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the "waiver" rule in the federal system.48
DisMissAL OF INDICTMENT FOR LACK OF PROSECUTION
After a delay of twenty-one months, (through no fault of their own) the
defendants made a motion pursuant to Section 668 of the New York Code of
Criminal Procedure to have the indictments against them dismissed for failure
to prosecute. In granting the motion the trial judge stated, "The facts are
such as to bring the matter squarely within the holding of the Court of Appeals
in People v. Prosser." The Appellate Division affirmed,49 but on appeal the
order was reversed by the Court of Appeals in a four-three decision. 50
Section 668 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
If a defendant, indicted for a crime whose trial has not been
postponed upon his application, be not brought to trial at the next
term of the court in which the indictment is triable, after it is found
the court may, on application of the defendant, order the indictment
to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary be shown.
The words of the statute make it evident that Section 668 confers a purely
discretionary power upon the court. It is because the power granted is one of
discretion that the problem in the case of People v. Alfonso arises.51
As stated earlier, the County Court based its decision on People v. Prosser.5
In that case the Grand Jury returned five indictments in 1946 against the
defendant. Soon after the defendant pleaded guilty to two of the indictments,
and was sentenced as a fourth felony offender, to imprisonment for an inde-
terminate term of 15 years to life. In 1952 the defendant was released from
prison, since he had been improperly sentenced as a fourth felony offender.
The District Attorney then re-arraigned the defendant on one of the three
indictments to which, six years before, he had pleaded not guilty. On that re-
arraignment he moved under Section 668 to dismiss for failure to prosecute
and because he had been denied his right to a speedy trial. The County
Judge denied the motion and the defendant was convicted. The Appellate
Division affirmed the conviction. On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that, as a matter of law, the defendant's motion to dismiss should
have been granted. A delay of six years was so great that the denial amounted
to an abuse of discretion by the County Judge. Since there was an untoward
delay of six years, without a waiver by defendant of his right to a speedy
non-included crime would place him twice in jeopardy, because he had been impliedly
acquitted of that crime.
The doctrine of "waiver" is concededly fictional. The Green case explores opposing
considerations concerning the waiver doctrine, and has been noted in over a dozen law
reviews.
48. Note the impact of the Green decision upon a state court, in People v. Gomez,
50 Cal. 2d 640, 328 P.2d 976 (1958).
49. A.D.2d 892, 177 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (2d Dep't 1958).
50. 6 N.Y.2d 225, 189 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1959).
51. Ibid.
52. 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955).
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